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I. INTRODUCTION
Borrowers often wish, for various reasons, to satisfy their in-
debtedness prior to the maturity of the loan agreement. Con-
versely, lenders often wish to prevent early payment of the debt or,
alternatively, to exact a fee from the borrower for the privilege of
prepaying the debt. Between seven and ten percent of the approxi-
mately thirty-two million loans secured by mortgages on real estate
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are prepaid each year.' At least seventy percent of these loans con-
tain a provision in the loan agreement calling for a penalty in the
event of prepayment. 2 This Note discusses the rights of lenders
and borrowers when a borrower prepays a debt and suggests a res-
olution of those rights that is more appropriate than the resolution
provided by current law.
Part II A of this Note examines the rights of borrowers when
they choose to or are compelled to pay their debts prior to matur-
ity.3 Part II B examines a lender's right to refuse an early tender of
payment or to exact a fee or premium, known as a prepayment
penalty, from the borrower in return for allowing prepayment. Part
II C discusses the arguments supporting the validity of prepay-
ment penalties. Parts II D-G discuss the various ways in which
courts, state legislatures, and federal regulatory bodies have at-
tempted to adjust the rights of lenders and prepaying borrowers.
Finally, Part III suggests an approach to these issues that is consis-
tent with basic principles of law and justice and that recognizes
and protects the legitimate interests of both borrowers and
lenders.
1. These statistics have been provided by the Mortgage Bankers Association of
America.
2. Id.
3. Many, if not most, of the statutes and cases cited in this Note pertain specifically to
loans secured by a mortgage on real property because most disputes over the right to prepay
and the enforceability of a prepayment penalty arise in the context of a note secured by a
mortgage on residential real estate. Two reasons explain this fact. First, the nature of the
real estate market itself gives rise to this type of dispute with greater frequency than other
types of loans. It is common for an owner of real estate to wish to convey the property
before the note matures and pay off the mortgage, thereby absolving the owner of any con-
tinuing obligation. A continuing obligation would exist if, for example, the vendee merely
took subject to the note. Additionally, the lender often will not consent to an assumption or
"subject to" arrangement. This is perhaps less likely to occur in other contexts, such as
when the note is not for as long a period of time as the typical 30-year mortgage or when the
debtor is less likely to attempt to dispose of the security and retire the debt before maturity.
Second, commercial borrowers usually possess more sophistication and bargaining power
than the typical residential home buyer. Therefore, commercial borrowers are able to better
anticipate future problems and receive more favorable terms in the note, thus reducing the
likelihood of a dispute ending up in court. The latter point also may explain why state
legislatures have been more inclined to afford statutory protection for residential home buy-
ers than for other classes of borrowers.
Notwithstanding these facts, the principles developed in this Note should apply with
equal force to loans that are not secured by real estate, with the exception of those princi-
ples relating to some legal aspect unique to realty. Thus, for example, an argument against
allowing the collection of a prepayment penalty because it constitutes an unreasonable
restraint on alienation of real property obviously would not have application outside the real
estate mortgage context.
1987] PREPAYMENT PENALTIES
II. THE RIGHTS OF BORROWERS AND LENDERS IN PREPAYMENT
SITUATIONS
A. The Borrower's Right to Prepay
Most unsophisticated borrowers do not consider whether they
have the right to satisfy their debt prior to the time specified in
the loan agreement and, of those who do, many simply assume
they have a right to prepay. This assumption, however, is not nec-
essarily accurate. Brown v. Cole,4 an early English case, held that a
real estate mortgagor, prior to the maturity date specified in the
agreement, had neither the right to compel the mortgagee to ac-
cept an early tender of the mortgage payment nor the right to
compel the mortgagee to reconvey the property to the mortgagor.'
The Brown court declared that "[i]f mortgagors were allowed to
pay off their mortgage money at any time after the execution of
the mortgage, it might be attended with extreme inconvenience to
mortgagees, who generally advance their money as an invest-
ment." An additional reason cited by other courts in support of
this rule is simply that a contract should be strictly enforced ac-
cording to its terms.7
Various states8 adopted the common law rule announced in
Brown, and many states9 adhere to this rule even today.10
4. [1845] 14 L. J.-Ch. (n.s.) 167 (V.C.).
5. This notion of the mortgagee executing a reconveyance of the mortgaged property
to the mortgagor is comparable to a release of the property in the context of a modern
mortgage. Although most jurisdictions currently grant the mortgagee only a security interest
in the land securing the debt, at early common law the mortgagee actually received legal
title and the right to possess the property on the condition that the property be reconveyed
to the mortgagor upon satisfaction of the debt on the specified date. See generally G. NEL-
SON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANcE LAW § 1.2 (2d ed. 1985).
6. Brown, 14 L. J.-Ch. (n.s.) at 168.
7. See Smiddy v. Grafton, 163 Cal. 16, 19, 124 P. 433, 435 (1912). In Smiddy the court
stated that the mortgagee could not be compelled to accept payment of a mortgage not yet
due. The court adopted that rule without discussion or citation, but the context of the hold-
ing indicates that the reason the mortgagee did not have to accept payment was simply
because it was not yet due according to the terms of the instrument. See also Chapman v.
Ford, 246 Md. 42, 227 A.2d 26 (1967) (justifying a 10% prepayment penalty because the
terms of the note clearly called for it); Kruse v. Planer, 288 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 1979) (strictly
enforcing the terms of the note and holding that the borrower had no right to prepay
because the note conferred no such right); Peryer v. Pennock, 95 Vt. 313, 115 A. 105 (1921).
8. See, e.g., Saunders v. Frost, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 259 (1827); Porten v. Peterson, 139
Minn. 152, 166 N.W. 183 (1918); Pyross v. Fraser, 82 S.C. 498, 64 S.E. 407 (1909); see also
Smiddy v. Grafton, 163 Cal. 16, 124 P. 433 (1912); Peryer v. Pennock, 95 Vt. 313, 115 A. 105
(1921).
9. See, e.g., Dugan v. Grzybowski, 165 Conn. 173, 332 A. 2d 97 (1973); Kruse v. Planer,
288 N.W. 2d 12 (Minn. 1979); Boyd v. Life Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1977) (allowing a
prepayment penalty in a situation in which the note was silent as to prepayment, thereby
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Nevertheless, the borrower has the right to prepay its debt in
many situations. The right to prepay may be created by state stat-
ute," judicial decision, 2 or provision in the note.1 3 Additionally, a
federal statute or regulation may bestow prepayment privileges on
the debtor in certain limited situations.14 Unless the common law
has been abrogated in one of these manners, however, the debtor
cannot compel a creditor to accept an early tender of payment.
B. The Lender's Right to Charge a Penalty for Permitting
Prepayment
Lenders often are willing to surrender their right to insist on
strict compliance with the contract's payment terms and timing if
the borrower is willing to compensate the lender for the surrender.
The fee that a lender charges for allowing the borrower to satisfy
all or a portion of the debt before maturity is known as a "prepay-
ment penalty."
Prepayment penalties take two forms, "option" and "non-op-
tion.' 5 In the option prepayment penalty situation, the note con-
tains a prepayment clause delineating the borrower's right to pre-
pay, any limitations thereon, and the fee to be exacted if the
borrower exercises that right. A prepayment clause may prohibit
prepayment altogether or may provide for severe penalties in the
early life of the loan, with only moderate or completely abolished
penalties after a certain time period has elapsed.'8 The penalty
impliedly affirming that the borrower has no right to prepay).
10. One court stated the rule as follows:
A creditor can no more be compelled to accept payments on a contract before, by the
terms thereof, they are due, than can a debtor be compelled to make such payments
before they are due. The time of payment fixed by the terms of a pecuniary obligation
is a material provision, and each party has the right to stand on the letter of the agree-
ment and perform accordingly.
Preyer, 95 Vt. at 315, 115 A. at 105.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 98-139.
12. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Furches, 468 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1983) (holding that when a
note is silent as to prepayment, a presumption arises that it may be prepaid).
13. See, e.g., infra notes 16, 18 & 141.
14. See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
15. Williams v. Fassler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 10-11, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1980).
16. For example, in DeKalb County v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 235 Ga. 417, 219
S.E.2d 707 (1975), the note in question contained the following provision:
No right to prepay for five years; privilege to prepay in full or in part beginning in the
fifth year at a 5% penalty declining /2 of 1%. Penalty shall be calculated on the
unpaid principal balance of the loan. In any case, thirty days notice of intent to make
prepayment must be given in writing.
Id. at 418, 219 S.E.2d at 709.
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may be a percentage of the prepaid principal or a percentage of the
original loan amount. 17 Other prepayment clauses permit, within a
given time period, prepayment without penalty up to a stated
maximum, which may be a percentage of the loan's total original
balance, but impose a penalty for the amount prepaid within the
specified time period in excess of that limit. 8
In the non-option prepayment penalty situation the instru-
ment creating the debt is silent concerning prepayment and the
borrower, if it wishes to prepay, must negotiate with the lender for
that privilege. Unless the common-law rule has been abrogated,
the lender is free to refuse the early tender of payment. Typically,
however, the lender will agree to accept the prepayment, condi-
tioned upon the borrower's willingness to pay a penalty. The
amount of the penalty may depend on many factors.' 9 However,
Thus, while the borrower could not prepay before the fifth year and would be subject to
a substantial penalty immediately thereafter, by the fifteenth year of the note the penalty
would be only '12 of 1% of the outstanding principal and the borrower could prepay without
charge after that time.
17. See, e.g., Camellia Apartments, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.2d 667, 669 (Ct. Cl.
1964) (measuring the prepayment penalty as one percent of the original face amount of the
loan); Landohio Corp. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Mortgage & Realty Investors, 431 F. Supp.
475, 477 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (measuring the penalty as 31/2 % of the balance of the loan at the
time of prepayment).
18. An example of this type of provision is found in Powell v. Phoenix Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 247 (Ala. 1983). The provision in the mortgage read:
Borrower may prepay the principal amount outstanding in whole or in part. The Note
holder may require that any partial prepayments (i) be made on the date monthly
installments are due and (ii) be in the amount of that part of one or more monthly
installments which would be applicable to principal. Any partial prepayment shall be
applied against the principal amount outstanding and shall not postpone the due date
of any subsequent monthly installments or change the amount of such installments,
unless the Note holder shall otherwise agree in writing. If, within five years from the
date of this Note, Borrower make(s) any prepayments in any twelve month period be-
ginning with the date of this Note or anniversary dates thereof ('loan year') with money
lent to Borrower by a lender other than the Note holder, Borrower shall pay the Note
holder (a) during each of the first three loan years 5.5 percent of the amount by which
the sum of prepayments made in any such loan year exceeds twenty percent of the
original principal amount of this Note and (b) during the fourth and fifth loan years 3
percent of the amount by which the sum of prepayments made in any such loan year
exceeds twenty percent of the original principal amount of this Note.
Id. at 248 n.1.
19. Theoretically, a lender will consider the following factors: (1) any fixed costs asso-
ciated with the loan that have not been recovered yet; and (2) the rate of interest at which
the lender can reinvest the prepaid loan as compared to the rate on the loan being prepaid.
See infra text accompanying notes 24, 25, 28 & 29. The lender may wish to maximize the
amount of the penalty to generate revenue. See infra text accompanying note 45. Finally,
the amount of the penalty may be limited by applicable statutes or regulations. See infra
text accompanying notes 98-155.
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some states prohibit, either judicially or statutorily, the collection
of a prepayment penalty if the note does not contain an explicit
provision permitting a prepayment penalty.2
C. Reasons Supporting the Validity of Prepayment Penalties
The Brown v. Cole21 court observed that a rule allowing bor-
rowers to satisfy their obligations prior to the time stipulated in
the note would be detrimental to lenders, "who generally advance
their money as an investment. ' 22 This rationale remains sound and
continues to provide one of the strongest arguments for allowing
lenders to refuse to accept an early tender of payment or, alterna-
tively, to exact a prepayment fee to ameliorate the attendant nega-
tive consequences. 2' Among the various reasons supporting the
validity of prepayment penalties are the following: (1) the need for
lenders to recoup their fixed administrative costs; (2) the need to
protect lenders from the detrimental effects of borrower refinanc-
ing; (3) the revenue concerns of lenders; and (4) tax considerations.
The first argument supporting prepayment penalties recog-
nizes that every loan entails certain fixed administrative costs,
such as time spent reviewing and approving the loan application,
investigating the loan applicant, and executing the necessary docu-
ments.24 Assuming that the administrative costs are amortized
fully over the duration of the loan, an early satisfaction of the note
would deprive the lender of the opportunity to recover these
costs.2 5 At least one commentator, however, has argued that this
reasoning ignores modern lending practices, whereby lenders
recoup their administrative costs at the loan's inception 26 by charg-
20. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Furches, 468 A.2d 458 (Pa. 1983); infra notes 98, 99 & 103.
21. [1845] 14 L.J.-Ch. (n.s.) 167 (V.C.).
22. Id. at 168.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 28-44.
24. See, e.g., Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 142,
145-46, 186 Cal. Rptr. 823, 825 (1982) (allowing a prepayment penalty because of the admin-
istrative costs associated with making the loan and the time lag between receipt of the pre-
payment and the lender's reinvestment of those funds); Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. 1976) (citing expenses incurred in making the loan,
including appraisals, inspection costs, and attorney's fees).
25. See Mid-America Dev. Corp. v. Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 257 Ark. 850, 852,
520 S.W. 2d 238, 239 (1975) (citing expenses incurred by the lender in making the loan as
justification for allowing a prepayment penalty); Arkansas Farm Prods., Inc. v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 267 Ark. 653, 654-55, 590 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1979).
26. Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in Cali-
fornia in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F. L.
REv. 267, 295 (1972).
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ing "points," loan commissions, and fees, all of which effectively
force the borrower to pay for the loan's administrative expenses at
the outset.2 7 To the extent that lenders are compensated for their
administrative costs at the inception of the loan, this reason no
longer justifies retaining the common-law rule endorsing prepay-
ment penalties. Fixed administrative cost compensation, however,
is not the only argument supporting the legality of prepayment
penalties.
A second argument for permitting prepayment penalties is
that lenders must be able to charge a penalty in order to insulate
themselves from the devastating effects of wholesale debt refinanc-
ing by borrowers in times of falling interest rates.28 By charging a
prepayment premium, lenders discourage prepayment and "lock
in" loans at higher interest rates. This strategy helps to maintain a
profitable loan portfolio, especially when used in conjunction with
a due-on-sale clause. A due-on-sale clause, which commonly is in-
cluded in real estate mortgages, is a provision that gives the mort-
gagee the right to call the entire debt due if the mortgagor conveys
the property.20
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 142,
146, 186 Cal. Rptr. 823, 825-26 (1982); Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 206 Neb. 469,
479, 293 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1980).
29. Similarly, a due-on-encumbrance clause allows a mortgagee to accelerate the debt
whenever the mortgaged property is encumbered. An example of a due-on-sale clause, the
one contained in the standard form approved by the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), is found in Powell
v. Phoenix Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 247 (Ala. 1983). The clause reads as follows:
If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Bor-
rower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or
encumbrance subordinate to this mortgage, (b) the creation of a purchase money secur-
ity interest for household appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent or by operation
of law upon the death of a joint tenant, or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of
three years or less not containing an option to purchase, Lender may, at Lender's
option, declare all the sums secured by this Mortgage to be immediately due and paya-
ble. Lender shall have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer,
Lender and the person to whom the property is to be sold or transferred reach agree-
ment in writing that the credit of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the
interest payable on the sums secured by this Mortgage shall be at such rate as Lender
shall request. If Lender has waived the option to accelerate provided in this paragraph
17, and if Borrower's successor in interest has executed a written assumption agree-
ment accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release Borrower from all obligations
under this Mortgage and the note.
If Lender exercises such option to accelerate, Lender shall mail Borrower notice of
acceleration in accordance with paragraph 14 hereof. Such notice shall provide a period
of not less than 30 days from the date the note is mailed within which Borrower may
pay the sums declared due. If Borrower fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of
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A lender, therefore, can use a prepayment penalty in conjunc-
tion with a due-on-sale clause to accelerate a particular note or
mortgage, thereby calling the whole debt immediately due and
payable, then exact a fee from the debtor for allowing the debtor
this dubious "privilege." 30 Although this practice may seem pa-
tently unfair to borrowers, it must seem too good to be true from a
lender's perspective. In fact, it no longer is true in certain contexts.
First, several states have enacted statutes that prohibit a lender
from accelerating a note pursuant to a due-on-sale clause and then
demanding a prepayment penalty.3 1 Almost universally, however,
these statutes apply only if the mortgaged property is residential
property.3 2 Second, several courts have held that lenders may not
exact a prepayment penalty in a due-on-sale situation." A recur-
ring rationale among these holdings is that the lender, by acceler-
ating the debt, has rendered the entire principal amount due,
thereby making it impossible for any subsequent payment to be
characterized as a prepayment.3 4 Finally, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB), pursuant to the Garn-St. Germain Deposi-
tory Institutions Act of 1982,' 5 has promulgated a regulation for-
bidding all lenders, not just federally chartered lenders, from accel-
erating a loan under a due-on-sale clause and then demanding
such period, Lender may, without further notice or demand on Borrower, invoke any
remedies permitted by paragraph 18 hereof.
Powell, 434 So. 2d. at 249.
30. See, e.g., Chapman v. Ford, 246 Md. 42, 227 A.2d 26 (1967).
31. See infra notes 128-30.
32. See id. and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Tan v. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 140 Cal. App. 3d 800, 809, 189
Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (1983); Slevin Container Corp. v. Provident Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98
Ill. App. 3d 646, 648, 424 N.E.2d 939, 941 (1981); American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mid-
America Serv. Corp., 329 N.W.2d 124, 125-26 (S.D. 1983). But see Chapman v. Ford, 246
Md. 42, 227 A.2d 26 (1967).
34. See, e.g., Tan, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 782; Slevin Container
Corp., 98 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 424 N.E.2d at 941; American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 329
N.W.2d at 125-26. The statement of the American Federal court is typical of these cases:
"Where the discretion to accelerate the maturity of the obligations is that of the obligee, the
exercise of the election renders the payment made pursuant to the election one made after
maturity and by definition not prepayment." Id. at 126.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Uresti, 553 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), con-
cerned not a mortgage on real estate, but a vehicle lien that the lender had accelerated. The
court stated that "[o]nce the maturity date is accelerated to the present, it is no longer
possible to prepay the debt before maturity. Any payment made after acceleration of the
maturity date is made after maturity, not before." Id. at 663 (emphasis in original).
35. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
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payment of a prepayment fee.3 6 This prohibition, however, applies
only if the mortgaged property is a home in which the borrower
lives or will live.3 7
Lenders should be prohibited from accelerating a debt and
then collecting a prepayment penalty for various reasons other
than the inherent unfairness of the practice. First, the justifica-
tions for enforcing prepayment penalties are wholly inapplicable in
a due-on-sale clause acceleration context. The lender cannot con-
tend convincingly that prepayment of the debt will work to its det-
riment by preventing recovery of the loan's costs when it is the
lender who insists on early payment. Moreover, the second justifi-
cation for enforcing prepayment penalties, that of locking in loans
at higher interest rates in times of declining interest rates, also is
irrelevant. If interest rates were truly at a level lower than that of
the note, the lender would not accelerate except in very limited
circumstances, such as when failure to accelerate would increase
the risk of default to an unacceptable level or leave the lender un-
secured or under-secured. Instead, the lender would consent to the
conveyance of the property, with the vendee assuming or taking
subject to the mortgage, and continue to collect payments at the
higher rate of interest. The due-on-sale clause serves almost exclu-
sively to call due loans made at a rate of interest lower than the
current rate, thus allowing the lender to reinvest the funds at the
higher current rate.3 8 A due-on-sale clause helps the lender main-
tain a profitable portfolio in times of rising interest rates39 and,
therefore, is most effective when used in tandem with a prepay-
36. 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2) (1986); see Comment, Prepayment Penalties After Garn-
St. Germain: A Minor Coup for Consumers, 3 DL'r. C.L. REv. 835 (1985). Commentators
have suggested that the FHLBB may have exceeded the scope of its statutory authority by
promulgating this regulation and, therefore, that it may be attacked successfully as ultra
vires. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 6.5.
37. 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2) (1986).
38. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 5.21. Even if the lender does not
demand payment in full and thereafter reinvest the funds at the market rate, the lender
may use the threat of acceleration to exact a higher rate of interest from the vendee who
assumes the mortgage. Id. at n.3; see, e.g., Lake v. Equitable Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Idaho
923, 674 P.2d 419 (1983); Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d
580 (1976).
39. See Redd v. Western Say. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d 761, 767 (Utah 1982) (sanctioning
the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause because it was "justified by legitimate interests of
the parties [and recognizing that] lenders must be able to compete with inflation or they will
not long remain in existence"); see also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 169 n.21 (stating that over 40% of the losses suffered by savings and loan
associations in California in 1981 resulted from that state's restrictions on the use of due-
on-sale clauses).
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ment penalty, which insulates the lender during times of falling
interest rates. However, because these two provisions serve to
maintain the profitability of the lender's portfolio only during
times of directly opposing market conditions, the lender's interest
in maintaining a profitable loan portfolio cannot justify the con-
current use of both the prepayment penalty and the due-on-sale
clause. Thus, when a lender accelerates a debt during times of ris-
ing interest rates pursuant to a due-on-sale clause, the lender ben-
efits from the early payment because then it can reinvest the
money at the higher rate. Consequently, the lender cannot claim
that a prepayment penalty is needed to maintain a profitable port-
folio by locking in the loan at the old rate.40
Lenders' use of prepayment penalties and due-on-sale clauses
to maintain profitable yields is not totally unjustified. The point is
merely that their use, at the same time and with respect to the
same loan, is neither legitimate nor logical. In a broader sense,
lenders' use of either the due-on-sale or prepayment penalty clause
as an overall strategy to achieve higher yields during times of fluc-
tuating interest rates, but without enforcing both provisions simul-
taneously, presents a much less objectionable scenario. A lender
can use the due-on-sale clause to increase its overall yield in times
of increasing interest rates 41 and the prepayment penalty to main-
tain its yield when interest rates decline. Even this scenario, how-
ever, seems to give the lender a two-edged advantage with no con-
comitant concession to the borrower. When interest rates increase,
a borrower wishing to sell its real estate will have its low-interest
loan accelerated and, thus, will not be able to benefit from that
lower rate by commanding a higher price for its property.42 Con-
versely, when interest rates decrease, the borrower cannot benefit
from that decrease by refinancing at the lower rates because the
prepayment penalty has locked the borrower in at the higher rate.
40. The FHLBB has recognized this and, in discussing the use of a prepayment pen-
alty in conjunction with a due-on-sale clause, has stated, "While the ability to impose a
prepayment or equivalent fee upon due-on-sale acceleration may be of some economic bene-
fit to the lender, it is in no sense essential to effective use of the due-on-sale clause for the
purpose of raising portfolios yields to current market rates." 48 FED. REG. 21,560 (1983).
41. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
42. See Powell v. Phoenix Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 247 (Ala. 1983). "With
the due-on-sale clause in a fixed rate mortgage, the borrower is free from the effects of rising
interest rates until he decides to sell . . . . At this point he may experience some difficulty
in selling the home without a considerable reduction in the sale price." Id. at 253; see also
Lake v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Idaho 923, 929, 674 P.2d 419, 425 (1983) (Shep-
ard, J., dissenting).
418 [Vol. 40:409
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The lender enjoys a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation, while
the borrower seemingly bears an unduly disproportionate share of
the risk associated with fluctuating interest rates.4" Nevertheless,
courts frequently cite the need for lenders to lock in loans at
higher rates as support for permitting enforcement of prepayment
penalties.14
A third, though not often articulated, reason for lenders' de-
sire to collect a prepayment penalty is that penalties produce reve-
nue. One informal survey designates the prepayment penalty as
the third most significant source of income for lending institutions,
behind only interest collections and loan fees.45
The final justification that has been advanced in support of
the validity of prepayment penalties concerns the tax conse-
quences to the lender of a borrower's prepayment. At least one
court has enforced a provision providing for a penalty of fifty per-
cent of the prepaid principal .4 The justification for such a harsh
penalty was that the lender would incur a significant increase in
federal income tax liability if the borrower, in any given year, re-
paid more than the amount called for in the note.47
D. Judicial Treatment of Attacks on Prepayment Penalties
Prepayment penalties have been attacked frequently in court.
Generally, however, borrowers challenging the enforceability of
these penalties have not been successful. This section discusses the
43. See Lake v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Idaho 923, 674 P.2d 419 (1983)
(Shepard, J., dissenting). In Lake the dissent argued as follows:
Here, it is asserted that such institutions need have no concern for anything but their
own profitability and that whatever results flow from these transactions are risks to be
assumed by the public. I disagree. In a time of increasing interest cost, the borrower
finds himself unable to convey unless an interest premium is paid. In a time of falling
interest, a borrower is prevented from refinancing by obtaining a loan at lower interest
and paying off the original loan without likewise paying the original lender a premium/
penalty for prepayment. The home owner is placed at the mercy of forces he does not
understand and cannot control or plan against. I find it nothing short of incredulous
that such practices and procedures can be viewed as in the "public interest."
Id. at 931, 674 P.2d at 427.
44. See, e.g., Camellia Apartments, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.2d 667, 672 (Ct. Cl.
1964); Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 145-46, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26;
Lazzareschi Inv. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d at 309, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 421; Bell Bakeries v. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 418, 96 S.E.2d 415 (1957).
45. See Comment, Secured Real Estate Loan Prepayment and the Prepayment Pen-
alty, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 923, 924 n.10 (1963).
46. Williams v. Fassler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1980).
47. Id. at 12-13, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49; see also Miller v. Berkoski, 297 N.W.2d 334,
336 (Iowa 1980) (discussing the effect of prepayment on tax liability).
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various legal theories advanced by borrowers attacking the legality
of prepayment penalties.
Borrowers often have attacked prepayment penalties as viola-
tive of state usury statutes.4 This argument appears valid when
the total amount paid, including principal, interest, and prepay-
ment penalty, combines to give the lender a higher return on its
investment, up to the time of prepayment, than is allowable under
the applicable usury statute. This reasoning, however, assumes
that the penalty amount is interest for purposes of the usury laws.
Most courts, however, have held that a prepayment penalty is not
interest within the meaning of the usury statutes and, therefore,
that the stated maximum allowable interest rate does not prevent
the collection of a prepayment penalty.49
In the non-option penalty situation-when the note is silent as
to the amount of the penalty-courts have analyzed the penalty as
consideration for the lender surrendering its right to refuse an
early tender of payment.5 0 Because the penalty is not interest, the
usury statutes may not be invoked to prevent the lender from col-
48. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kernachan, 283 Ala. 96, 214 So. 2d 447 (1968); Win-
kle v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 267 Ark. 123, 601 S.W.2d 559 (1980); Mid-America Dev. Corp. v.
Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 257 Ark. 850, 520 S.W.2d 238 (1975); Eldred v. Hart, 87 Ark.
534, 113 S.W. 213 (1908); Arkansas Farm Prods., Inc. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 267 Ark.
653, 590 S.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1979); Williams v. Fasler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 167 Cal. Rptr.
545 (1980); Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d
303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971); Abbot v. Stevens, 133 Cal. App. 2d 242, 284 P.2d 159 (1955);
McCarty v. Mellinkoff, 118 Cal. App. 11, 4 P.2d 595 (1931); Dezell v. King, 91 So. 2d 624
(Fla. 1956); Webb v. Southern Trust Co., 227 Ky. 79, 11 S.W.2d 988 (1928); B.F. Saul Co. v.
West End Park N., Inc., 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d 591 (1968); Jackson Inv. Co. v. Bates, 366
So. 2d 225 (Miss. 1978); Hanson v. Acceptance Fin. Co., 270 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. Ct. App.
1954); Bloomfield Sav. Bank v. Howard S. Stainton & Co., 60 N.J. Super. 524, 159 A.2d 443
(1960); Redmond v. Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 147 N.Y.S.2d 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955);
Lyons v. Nat'l Say. Bank, 280 A.D. 339, 113 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952), rev'g 200
Misc. 652, 110 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1951); Feldman v. Kings Hwy. Say. Bank, 278 A.D. 589, 102
N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. App. Div.), afl'd, 303 N.Y. 675, 102 N.E. 2d 835 (1951); Bell Bakeries v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 408, 96 S.E.2d 408 (1957); Marley v. Consolidated
Mortgage Co., 102 R.I. 200, 229 A.2d 608 (1967); Reichwein v. Kirschenbaum, 98 R.I. 340,
201 A.2d 918 (1964); Luchesi v. Capitol Loan & Fin. Co., 83 R.I. 151, 113 A.2d 725 (1955);
Bearden v. Tarrant Say. Ass'n, 643 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Boyd v. Life Ins. Co.,
546 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
49. See, e.g., Arkansas Farm Prods., Inc., 267 Ark. at 656, 590 S.W.2d at 50; Williams,
110 Cal. App. 3d at 11, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 547; McCarty, 118 Cal. App. at 13, 4 P.2d at 596;
Webb, 227 Ky. at 83, 11 S.W.2d at 989; Feldman, 278 A.D. at 589-90, 102 N.Y.S. 2d at 307-
08; Lyons, 280 A.D. at 340-41, 113 N.Y.S.2d at 696; Bearden, 643 S.W.2d at 249-50; Boyd,
546 S.W.2d at 133.
50. See, e.g., Abbot, 133 Cal. App. 2d at 247, 284 P.2d at 162; McCarty, 118 Cal. App.
at 13, 4 P.2d at 596; Webb, 227 Ky. at 83, 11 S.W.2d at 989; Bloomfield Say. Bank, 60 N.J.
Super. at 531-32, 159 A.2d at 447; Feldman, 278 A.D. at 589-90, 102 N.Y.S. 2d at 307-08;
Lyons, 280 A.D. at 340-41, 113 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
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lecting the prepayment fee. Similarly, in the option penalty situa-
tion-when the terms of prepayment and the amount of the pen-
alty are specified in the note-courts have not viewed the penalty
as interest. Instead, the penalty is a fee exacted by the lender for
allowing the borrower the privilege of prepaying, or for creating an
alternative method of performance in the note.5 Courts have
tended to focus attention on the fact that it is the borrower who
decides if and when prepayment will be made and, therefore, it is
the borrower who triggers the penalty.52 Courts conclude that the
borrower should not be allowed, through its voluntary and unilat-
eral act of prepaying the loan, to render usurious a loan that other-
wise would be lawful if carried to maturity.5 3
Several problems plague this analysis. Foremost is the incon-
sistency between this approach, which defines prepayment as
something other than interest, and the frequently implied assump-
tion that the loan would be usurious if the prepayment provision
operated to give the lender a return on its investment in excess of
the maximum lawful rate when calculated to the date of maturity
instead of the date of prepayment.54 If the prepayment penalty
were truly consideration for the prepayment privilege rather than
interest, the loan should not be considered usurious even when the
combination of prepayment penalty and interest exceeds the maxi-
mum rate when calculated to maturity. One commentator has sug-
gested that this inconsistency is a result of the courts' attempt to
deal with the following dilemma:
Had the courts not suggested some limit to the penalties, they would have
endorsed a relatively simple means for circumventing the usury laws. On the
other hand, had they held the prepaid loan usurious, the full sanctions of the
51. See, e.g., Arkansas Farm Prods., Inc., 267 Ark. at 656, 590 S.W.2d at 50; Williams,
110 Cal. App. 3d at 11, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 547; Marley, 102 R.I. at 205-08, 229 A.2d at 611-13;
Bearden, 643 S.W.2d at 249; Boyd, 546 S.W.2d at 133.
52. See, e.g., Winkle, 267 Ark. at 139-C, 601 S.W.2d at 568; Eldred, 87 Ark. at 539, 113
S.W. at 215; Arkansas Farm Prods., Inc., 267 Ark. at 655-67, 590 S.W.2d at 50; Abbot, 133
Cal. App. 2d at 246, 284 P.2d at 162; Bloomfield Say. Bank, 60 N.J. Super. at 532, 159 A.2d
at 447; Redmond, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 703; Bell Bakeries, 245 N.C. at 418, 96 S.E.2d at 417;
Marley, 102 R.I. at 208, 229 A.2d at 612; Bearden, 643 S.W.2d at 249; Boyd, 546 S.W.2d at
133.
53. See, e.g., Winkle, 267 Ark. at 139-C, 601 S.W.2d at 568; Eldred, 87 Ark. at 539, 113
S.W. at 215; Abbot, 133 Cal. App. 2d at 247-48, 284 P.2d at 162; Dezell, 91 So. 2d at 627;
Hanson, 270 S.W.2d at 148.
54. See, e.g., Winkle, 267 Ark. at 139-C, 601 S.W.2d at 568; Eldred, 87 Ark. at 539, 113
S.W. at 215; Dezell, 91 So. 2d at 627; B. F. Saul, 250 Md. at 719, 246 A.2d at 599; Hanson,
270 S.W.2d at 148; Feldman, 278 A.D. at 590; Redmond, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 703; Marley, 102
R.I. at 208, 209 A.2d at 612-13; Bearden, 643 S.W.2d at 249.
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usury laws would have been brought to bear on the lenders.55
Even the courts' adopted limitation on prepayment penalties, how-
ever, is of little practical benefit to the borrower for two reasons.
First, usury statutes in some jurisdictions do not apply to all lend-
ers or classes of loans. 6 Second, this judicial limitation will not
save the prepaying borrower any money because the maximum al-
lowable penalty will be greater than or equal to the entire amount
of unearned interest on the note when calculated to maturity.5 7
Thus, it would be no more expensive, and perhaps even less expen-
sive, for the borrower to forego prepayment and simply pay the
note off according to its terms.
Another problem arises when the prepayment is involuntary.
Analysis of the usury law challenge to prepayment penalties is
based on the premise that the fee is merely consideration for al-
lowing the borrower to exercise the privilege of prepayment . 5 This
analysis, therefore, breaks down when the prepayment is involun-
tary or compelled by circumstances beyond the borrower's control,
such as condemnation or destruction of the property, acceleration
by the lender pursuant to a due-on-sale or encumbrance clause, or
involuntary default by the borrower.59 Despite breakdowns in this
analysis, courts generally do not appear receptive to usury law
challenges to prepayment penalties.60
A second avenue of attack against prepayment penalties is the
argument that they are an invalid penalty because they bear no
reasonable relationship to the damages actually sustained by the
lender because of the prepayment."' This argument fails when the
penalty is minimal or the damage to the lender is quite severe.
55. See Comment, supra note 45, at 927.
56. See, e.g., id. at 928. See generally 45 AM. JuP 2d Interest & Usury § 9 (1969); 47
C.J.S. Interest & Usury; Consumer Credit § 92 (1982).
57. If, as this approach permits, the penalty is calculated to give the lender a sum that
represents a return on its investment equal to the maximum allowable interest rate on the
loan calculated to maturity, this penalty amount cannot be less than the penalty derived if
the actual interest rate is used; the interest rate on the note cannot, by definition, exceed
the maximum allowable rate.
58. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
59. But see Jackson Inv. Co. v. Bates, 366 So.2d 225 (Miss. 1978) (allowing a prepay-
ment penalty despite a usury law challenge when the lender demanded prepayment after
destruction of the security).
60. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Sacramento Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 142,
186 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1982); Williams v. Fassler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1980);
Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 417 (1971); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Madorsky, 353 So.2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1978).
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Even when the penalty charged far exceeds any damages sustained
by the lender, however, many courts have continued to enforce the
penalty.6 2 The reasoning espoused by these courts is somewhat
analogous to the rationale used to reject usury statute challenges
to prepayment penalties: the prepayment is merely an alternative
means by which the borrower can perform its obligation under the
contract.6 3 For example, in Lazzareschi Investment Co. v. San
Francisco Federal Savings & Loan Association64 the court upheld
a penalty of six months interest against an attack on the validity of
the penalty. The court declared that prepayment is not a breach of
contract for which the law demands actual damages to be reasona-
bly related to the penalty. 5 Thus, the court held inapplicable the
principle forbidding the collection of a penalty that does not ap-
proximate the actual damages caused by the breach of contract.66
Other courts have approached this issue in a similar manner.27
Borrowers also have challenged the enforceability of prepay-
ment penalties by characterizing them as invalid liquidated dam-
ages provisions. 8 The Lazzareschi court, however, held that the
prepayment penalty was not a provision for liquidated damages.6 9
The court found that the note's prepayment provision was not
made in contemplation of a breach, but instead merely created an
alternative method of performance for the borrower.7 ° Other courts
have used this theory to reach the same conclusion.71
62. See supra note 61.
63. Williams, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 11-13, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 547-48; Lazzareschi Inv. Co.,
22 Cal. App. 3d at 307, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
64. 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971).
65. "[T]here has been no breach. The borrower had the option. . . of making one or
more prepayments. He ... availed himself of the option .... [T]here is no penalty in the
sense of retribution for breach of an agreement." Lazzareschi Inv. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d at
307, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
66. Id. Nevertheless, the court assumed that palpably exorbitant penalties would be
unenforceable. The court concluded that because this particular penalty provision exceeded
neither the usual penalty nor the one authorized by FHLBB regulations, and because it
protected the lender's legitimate interests, it was not unreasonable. Lazzareschi Inv. Co., 22
Cal. App. 3d at 308-11, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 420-23.
67. See Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 146, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 826;
Williams, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 11-13, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 547-49; Century Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 353 So.2d at 869 (dismissing the borrower's claim that a prepayment penalty of 12
months interest constituted unjust enrichment).
68. See Williams v. Fassler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1980); Meyers v.
Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 38 Cal. App. 3d 544, 113 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974).
69. Lazzareschi Inv. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d at 307, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
70. Id.
71. See Williams, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 12-13, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (holding a 50%
prepayment penalty enforceable because it was an alternative means of performance and
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Finally, prepayment penalties in notes secured by mortgages
on real estate also have been assailed as an unreasonable restraint
on alienation.72 Again, courts generally have been unreceptive to
this line of attack.7" The Lazzareschi court began with the proposi-
tion that restraints on alienation that are not absolute and that
serve to protect a "justifiable interest" are not inherently illegal.
The court summarized its prepayment discussion by stating that
"[t]he prepayment charge by no means constitutes an absolute re-
straint and because we do not regard it as an exorbitant burden
• . . and because there are legitimate interests of the lender to be
protected, . . . we do not discern an unlawful restraint on aliena-
tion."1 4 At least one court has relied on Lazzareschi to reach the
same conclusion concerning an identical prepayment provision. 5
E. Special Considerations in Involuntary Prepayment
Situations
Special considerations concerning the validity of a prepayment
penalty come into play when the prepayment is not a voluntary act
on the part of the borrower. For example, the lender may acceler-
ate a note pursuant to a due-on-sale clause. 6 Other examples of
involuntary prepayment situations in the context of a note secured
by real estate occur when the mortgaged premises are condemned
or destroyed and a provision in the note allows the lender to accel-
erate the debt.
Applying the basic justifications for allowing a prepayment
penalty does not necessarily resolve involuntary prepayment is-
sues, but it may help focus attention on the parties' real interests
and, thus, point toward an equitable solution. If the prepayment
because, at the time of making the contract, it was a reasonable approximation of actual
damages); Meyers, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 545-47, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60 (holding a prepay-
ment penalty not to be an invalid liquidated damages clause because it did not envision a
breach of the contract, but rather provided an alternative means of performance).
72. Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 142, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 823 (1982); Lazzareschi Inc. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App.
3d 303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971); Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d
456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969); see also Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Randall, 283 Or. 297, 583 P.2d
1126 (1978) (upholding a provision in the note prohibiting prepayment for 11 years against
borrower's allegation that it constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation).
73. See supra note 72.
74. Lazzareschi Inv. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 99 Cal Rptr. at 422.
75. Sacramento Say. & Loan, 137 Cal. App. at 145-47, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26.
76. See supra notes 29-30.
77. See, e.g., Jackson Inv. Co. v. Bates, 366 So. 2d 225 (Miss. 1978); Knoxville Hous.
Auth., Inc. v. Bush, 56 Tenn. App. 464, 408 S.W.2d 407 (1966).
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penalty is necessary to compensate the lender for the loan's fixed
costs, which have been amortized over the life of the loan, no rea-
son justifies not allowing the lender to collect this penalty even if
prepayment is involuntary. Under modern practices, however, a
lender arguably recovers its fixed costs at the inception of the
loan.78 Therefore, to the extent that this is true, the collection of
any prepayment penalty, especially in involuntary prepayment sit-
uations, is unjustified. Furthermore, the argument that lenders
must charge a prepayment penalty to avoid or mitigate the devas-
tating effects on their portfolio yields that would result if borrow-
ers were free to refinance their debts whenever interest rates
dropped is not applicable when circumstances beyond the mortga-
gor's control force prepayment. This is especially true because the
lender, instead of calling the debt due immediately, could allow the
borrower, in the case of destruction, to apply the insurance pro-
ceeds toward rebuilding the structure, 7 or could allow the mortga-
gor, in the case of condemnation, to use the condemnation award
to purchase or build another structure."0 In both cases, the process
can be carried out under the lender's supervision or subject to its
78. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
79. Most of the mortgage forms used today provide for the disposition of insurance
proceeds in the event of the mortgaged property's destruction. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
supra note 5, at § 4.15. For example, the Federal National Mortgage Association/Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Uniform Mortgage-Deed of Trust Covenants-Single
Family Form contains the following provision:
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, insurance proceeds shall be
applied to restoration or repair of the Property damaged, if the restoration or repair is
economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. If the restoration or repair
is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance pro-
ceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not
then due, with any excess paid to Borrower. If Borrower abandons the Property, or
does not answer within 30 days a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has
offered to settle a claim, then Lender may collect the insurance proceeds. Lender may
use the proceeds to repair or restore the Property or to pay sums secured by this Secur-
ity Instrument, whether or not then due. The 30-day period will begin when the notice
is given.
Id. at § 14.3, para. 5.
80. Commentators have pointed out that a condemnation situation is not necessarily
analogous to a situation in which the security is destroyed because, in the latter instance, if
the mortgagee allows the mortgagor to rebuild, the mortgagee's security is unimpaired, while
in the former, allowing the mortgagor to keep the condemnation award would result in an
unsecured loan. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 6.3. There is no reason, how-
ever, why the mortgagee could not allow the mortgagor to keep the condemnation award on
the condition that the mortgagor purchase or build on another piece of property, thereby
securing the debt. This would not differ substantially from the common practice of allowing
the mortgagor to keep the insurance proceeds in cases of destruction, conditioned on the
rebuilding of a structure that would not impair the security. See also supra note 79.
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approval, thereby ensuring that the new structure will secure the
debt adequately. The lender, therefore, could abstain from acceler-
ating the debt and allow the original loan to survive according to
its terms in both destruction and condemnation situations."' If the
lender does accelerate, the prepayment is especially involuntary
because the borrower does not wish to dispose of the property or
prepay the debt.
A common mortgage provision allows the mortgagee to collect
a prepayment penalty whether prepayment is voluntary or invol-
untary. 2 Arguably, the mortgagor's signing of a note containing a
prepayment penalty provision constitutes a waiver of its right to
make the above arguments. The equities of the situation, however,
may demand relief.83 These situations naturally provoke sympathy
for the mortgagor and, indeed, some courts have shown a willing-
ness to intervene and prevent the collection of prepayment
penalties. 84
In Chestnut Corp. v. Bankers Bond & Mortgage Co. 5 the
court refused to allow the lender to collect a prepayment penalty
on a loan that was prepaid with insurance proceeds after fire de-
stroyed the property. The court balanced the parties' interests and
concluded that the equities weighed against enforcement of the
penalty.8 8 It is unclear whether the court would have applied this
81. In the destruction context several courts have been willing to require the mortga-
gee to allow the mortgagor to apply the insurance proceeds toward rebuilding when the note
does not state otherwise and when the security will not be impaired because this result is
deemed more equitable. G. NELSON D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 4.15. Because the same
equities are present when the security is condemned, a similar result should follow.
82. For example, the prepayment penalty provision in the note at issue in Lazzareschi
Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 305, 99 Cal. Rptr.
417, 418 (1971), contained the following language: "The undersigned agree that such six (6)
months advance interest shall be due and payable whether said prepayment is voluntary or
involuntary, including any prepayment effected by the exercise of any acceleration clause
provided for herein."
83. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 6.3 (suggesting that the inclusion
of a penalty provision in the debt instrument, while perhaps precluding the debtor from
challenging the collection of the prepayment penalty, may constitute an invalid penalty for
the breach of an obligation); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 2985.6(b) (West Supp. 1987) (stating
that any provision in a land sale contract waiving a vendee's statutory right to make prepay-
ment shall be void as against public policy).
84. See infra notes 85-89.
85. 395 Pa. 153, 149 A.2d 48 (1959).
86. The court discussed the interests of the parties as follows:
The question posed is a difficult one. A prepayment clause is ordinarily inserted to
compensate a mortgagee for the cost and expenses attendant in making a new long
term mortgage loan. The obligor-mortgagor was clearly given the right or privilege at
its election to pay the balance of principal in full before maturity. Plaintiff (who is the
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reasoning if the note had called for a prepayment penalty regard-
less of whether the prepayment was voluntary. 7
When the mortgaged property has been condemned, courts
also have been unwilling to sanction the collection of a penalty.8
These courts reason that when the property is condemned, prepay-
ment is involuntary and outside the scope of the note's prepay-
ment provision, which only applies to voluntary prepayments. 9 At
owner and who stands in the shoes of the obligor-mortgagor) correctly contends (a)
that the prepayment was not voluntary on its part, and (b) that no prepayment was
made by it, and (c) that no 30 days prior written notice of an intention to prepay the
unpaid principal debt was ever given as required by the bond. The mortgagee was paid
the entire unpaid principal balance of the mortgage plus accrued interest not because
of any desire on the part of the plaintiff to prepay the debt, nor in compliance with the
exact terms of the Rider, but solely because of the fire and the provisions with respect
thereto in the fire insurance policies. Nevertheless, at least in theory, defendant would
be put to some cost and expense to make a new mortgage loan. On the other hand,
plaintiff, while it has received the full net amount of the fire insurance, has lost its
building, and if it desired to rebuild it would have to obtain a new mortgage loan, and
in the meantime it would be without a building and would lose whatever contracts and/
or leases it had made. In such a situation both parties suffer, but the owner suffers
most.
Id. at 155-56, 149 A.2d at 50 (emphasis in original); see also Jackson Inv. Co. v. Bates, 366
So. 2d 225 (Miss. 1978) (invoking equitable principles to order refund to debtor of unearned
precomputed interest when loan was accelerated after destruction of security).
87. The Chestnut Corp. court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the note was
silent as to this particular contingency. The court stated:
Neither the bond nor the mortgage specifically or expressly provides for the exact situ-
ation which has arisen, namely, a prepayment of the entire principal loan with interest
during the premium period, due not to a voluntary election of prepayment but to a fire.
If defendant (the obligee-mortgagee) believed it should be entitled to the premium
under these circumstances it could easily and should have so provided in the bond and/
or mortgage. In the absence of such a provision we believe that defendant who received
the entire unpaid principal and accrued interest of its mortgage is not entitled to the
prepayment premium.
Chestnut Corp., 395 Pa. at 156-57, 149 A.2d at 50. Compare Chestnut Corp. v. Banker's
Bond & Mortgage Co., 395 Pa. 153, 149 A.2d 48 (1959) with In re Brooklyn Bridge South-
west Urban Renewal Project, 46 Misc. 2d 558, 260 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Super. Ct.), af'd, 24
A.D.2d 710, 262 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1965) (holding a provision in the note expressly providing
for the collection of a prepayment penalty in the event of condemnation to be enforceable).
88. See, e.g., Associated Schools, Inc. v. Dade County, 209 So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); DeKalb County v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 235 Ga. 417, 219 S.E.2d 707
(1975); Jala Corp. v. Berkeley Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 104 N.J. Super. 394, 250 A.2d 150 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969); Silverman v. State, 48 A.D.2d 413, 370 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1975);
Landohio Corp. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Mortgage & Realty Investors, 431 F. Supp. 475
(N.D. Ohio 1976); see also Knoxville Hous. Auth., Inc. v. Bush, 56 Tenn. App. 464, 408
S.W.2d, 407 (1966) (holding that mortgagor could not recover amount of prepayment pen-
alty from condemnor, but reserving judgment on whether a prepayment penalty should be
effective as between the mortgagor and mortgagee). See generally Annotation, Compensa-
tion for interest prepayment in emminent domain proceedings, 84 A.L.R.3d 946 (1978).
89. For example, the Jala Corp. court stated:
Thus, in the instant case we find that plaintiffs did not voluntarily exercise any "right"
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least two states have statutorily forbidden the collection of a pre-
payment penalty when prepayment is occasioned by condemnation
of the mortgaged property. 0 Other states have taken a different
approach and require the agency taking the property to include in
the condemnation award all "expenses [the owner] necessarily in-
curred [as] . ..penalty costs for prepayment for any preexisting
recorded mortgage."91 The Uniform Relocation Assistance Policies
Act 92 requires this approach for federally funded projects.9 3
Some courts also have prevented the lender from collecting a
prepayment penalty after accelerating the debt in response to the
borrower's default.94 The court's rationale in In re LHD Realty
Corp., that "acceleration, by definition, advances the maturity date
of the debt so that payment thereafter is not prepayment but in-
stead is payment made after maturity," is typical of these deci-
sions.9 5 Other courts have recognized, either implicitly or explicitly,
the validity of this reasoning in decisions permitting the collection
of a prepayment penalty when the lender only has threatened ac-
celeration or rescinded a prior acceleration.9" If the rule were
or "privilege" to prepay the unpaid balance of the mortgage, as was contemplated by
the prepayment clause contained in the mortgage. Rather, the mortgage was prepaid by
reason of the fact that the State pursuant to its paramount right of eminent domain
took the property for public use. . . . We cannot construe the language of the prepay-
ment clause to make it applicable to the instant situation. Rather, we hold that the
parties in inserting this clause did not contemplate a taking of the premises by eminent
domain . . . . "If defendant (the obligee-mortgagee) believed it should be entitled to
the premium under these circumstances it could easily and should have so provided in
the bond and/or mortgage. In the absence of such a provision we believe that defend-
ant who received the entire unpaid principal and accrued interest of its mortgage is not
entitled to the prepayment premium."
Jala Corp., 104 N.J. Super. at 400-01, 250 A.2d at 154 (quoting Chesnut Corp. v. Bankers
Bond & Mortgage Co., 395 Pa. 153, 158, 149 A.2d 48, 59 (1959)); see also In re Brooklyn
Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project, 46 Misc. 2d 558, 260 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.), af'd, 24 A.D. 710, 262 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1965) (holding enforceable a provision in the
note expressly providing for the collection of a prepayment penalty in the event of
condemnation).
90. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1265.240 (West 1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, §57
(West 1977).
91. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-965 (1977); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-282
(West Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 10 (West 1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-11-30
(Law. Co-op 1977).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1982). The Uniform Relocation Assistance Policies Act is
federal legislation.
93. Id. §§ 4653 & 4655.
94. In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1984); Kilpatrick v. Germania Life
Ins. Co., 183 N.Y. 163, 75 N.E. 1124 (1905); Nutman, Inc. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 115
Misc.2d 168, 453 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
95. In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d at 330-31.
96. See, e.g., Bell Bakeries, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 408, 96
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adopted, however, that a lender cannot collect a prepayment pen-
alty when it has accelerated the debt because of a borrower's
breach, an unscrupulous debtor wishing to prepay without incur-
ring a penalty only would have to intentionally default or other-
wise provoke the lender into accelerating the debt. Clearly, this is
not a result that the courts should sanction.
9 7
F. Legislative Activity Concerning Prepayment Penalties
1. General Legislation
Because courts have been reluctant to abrogate the common-
law rule giving borrowers no right to prepay or to limit the permis-
sible amount of prepayment penalties, state legislatures have been
forced to protect the interests of borrowers. Legislation ranges
from prohibitions on prepayment penalties to mere codifications of
existing practices.
For example, Florida legislation grants the borrower the privi-
lege of prepaying the debt without penalty if the loan instrument
does not explicitly state otherwise.98 A North Carolina statute pro-
duces an identical result.9 9 Legislation of this kind eliminates the
non-option prepayment penalty. Tennessee, instead of following
the Florida and North Carolina approach of abrogating the com-
mon-law rule, enacted legislation preventing judicial modification
or abrogation of the common law.100
S.E.2d 408 (1957) (holding penalty collectible when prepayment occurred after lender in-
sisted on strict compliance with terms of note and threatened to exercise rights under note.
The court, however, recognized that the lender would have no right to enforce the penalty if
the note actually had been accelerated); West Portland Dev. Co. v. Cook, Inc., 246 Or. 67,
424 P.2d 212 (1967) (holding penalty collectible because lender rescinded prior acceleration
and reinstated note before prepayment); Berenato v. Bell Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Pa. Super.
599, 419 A.2d 620 (1980) (holding penalty collectible when lender, before prepayment,
stayed foreclosure sale and indicated intent to reinstate note after payments were brought
up to date); Cook v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 143 Wash. 145, 254 P. 834 (1927) (holding
penalty collectible on prepayment made after lender merely threatened to accelerate the
debt).
97. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.06 (West Supp. 1986). The Florida statute, which applies in
all situations, provides that "[a]ny note which is silent as to the right of the obligor to
prepay the note in advance of the stated maturity date may be prepaid in full by the obligor
or his successor in interest without penalty." Id.
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.4 (1986).
100. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-108 (1984). Tennessee's statute provides that "the privi-
lege of prepayment of a loan, in whole or in part, and any refunds or premiums with respect
thereto, shall be governed by contract between the parties." Id.
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2. Mortgage Loans: Prohibitions Against and Limitations Upon
Prepayment Penalties
Most legislation on prepayment penalties is neither as compre-
hensive nor as definitive as the legislation discussed in the preced-
ing subsection, but instead applies only to certain classes of lend-
ers or certain types of loans. For example, many states have
enacted statutes targeting residential real estate mortgages. 10 1 In
the residential real estate context there are almost as many ap-
proaches to regulating prepayment penalties as there are statutes.
Some states have enacted legislation that reverses the common-law
rule and forbids the lender from collecting a penalty.102 Conversely,
at least one other state statute requires merely that the loan agree-
ment "expressly and clearly state. . . any maximum prepayment
privilege penalty." 03 This statute applies to any loan secured by a
mortgage on real estate of a duration exceeding three years.10 A
violation of this requirement nullifies the prepayment provision. 10 5
Iowa's statute, while not specifically granting the right of prepay-
ment to the borrower, forbids the lender from collecting a penalty
if prepayment occurs. 08 The Iowa statute does not state explicitly
whether a lender may refuse the borrower's early tender of pay-
ment. 0 7 Illinois achieves a result similar to Iowa by forbidding col-
lection of a prepayment penalty on a residential mortgage in which
101. States have adopted different definitions of the real estate covered by this type of
statute. Pennsylvania's statute covers only "[r]esidential mortgage obligations." 41 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 405 (Purdon Supp. 1986). Many statutes are more specific. California regulates
"loan[s] for residential property of four units or less," CAL. Civ. CODE § 2954.9 (West Supp.
1986), while New York's statute applies to "a bond or note, or the mortgage on real prop-
erty, improved by a one to six family residence, occupied by the owner," N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 254-a (McKinney Supp. 1987). Similarly, Massachusetts applies its statute to "[a]ny
mortgage note secured by a first lien on a dwelling house of three or less separate house-
holds occupied or to be occupied in whole or in part by the mortgagor." MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 183, § 56 (West 1977). Iowa prohibits prepayment penalties in loans "used for the
purpose of purchasing real property which is a single-family or a two-family dwelling occu-
pied or to be occupied by the borrower." IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.9 (West Supp. 1986). Inter-
estingly, Iowa's prohibition also applies to loans used to purchase agricultural land. Id.
102. For example, New Jersey's statute states that "[p]repayment of a mortgage loan
may be made by or on behalf of a mortgagor at any time, without penalty." N.J. STAT. ANN
§ 46:10B-2 (West Supp. 1986). Pennsylvania has a similar statute, but it is limited in appli-
cation to residential mortgages. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 405 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
103. OR. REv. STAT. § 86.150(1) (1984).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 86.150(2).
106. IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.9 (West Supp. 1986).
107. The language of subsection 2, however, seems to suggest that the borrower has
the right to make prepayment and that the lender may do no more than require 30 days
notice and collect earned interest. Id. § 535.9(2).
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the interest rate exceeds eight percent per year."" Similarly, Min-
nesota forbids the collection of a prepayment penalty on loans se-
cured by a mortgage on residential real estate when the loan is
made by a credit union or certain other commercial lenders, or
when the loan is insured or guaranteed by the Veteran's Adminis-
tration (VA), the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), the Federal
Home Loan & Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), or the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA).1 9 Additionally, several
states have created the specific right to prepay, without penalty,
second mortgages made by certain lenders. 110
Some legislation regulating prepayment penalties on residen-
tial real estate mortgages does not prohibit completely the collec-
tion of prepayment penalties. Instead, many of these laws establish
a maximum allowable prepayment penalty during the various
stages of the life of the loan, with several statutes also granting the
borrower the right to prepay without penalty after a certain period
of time has elapsed. Ohio, for example, provides that any residen-
tial real estate mortgage may be prepaid without penalty after five
years and provides a maximum penalty of one percent of the origi-
nal principal if the loan is prepaid before five years.1 ' Similarly,
Missouri 1 2 and Mississippil allow a prepayment penalty only
during the first five years of the loan. Missouri establishes a maxi-
mum penalty of two percent of the loan balance at the time of
prepayment, whereas Mississippi allows a penalty of five percent of
the loan balance during the first year, declining one percent per
year until, in the fifth year, the maximum penalty is reduced to
108. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 6404(2)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
109. MINN. STAT ANN. § 47.20(5) (West Supp. 1987).
110. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 3125 (1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.234.(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:11A-50 (West 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-14(e)
(1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.57. (Page Supp. 1985); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
36-224(j)(West 1981) (creating the right to prepay, without penalty, a second mortgage after
three years and establishing a maximum penalty of five percent of the unpaid balance
before that time); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 398-A.2 (Supp. III 1986) (granting the borrower
the right to prepay and forbidding the imposition of a penalty unless the loan documents
clearly provide for a penalty).
111. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.011(3)(c) (Page 1979).
112. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.036 (Vernon Supp. 1987). Compare the standard used in
this statute to establish the amount of the penalty with that used in the Ohio statute, supra
note 111. Whereas Missouri calculates the penalty as a percentage of the outstanding princi-
pal at the time of prepayment, Ohio allows a penalty to be calculated as a percentage of the
original loan balance. California, on the other hand, measures the penalty as six months
interest on the amount of prepayment. See infra note 127.
113. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-31 (Supp. 1985). This section applies only to lenders
subject to the usury statute.
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one percent. Rhode Island permits prepayment after one year, but
permits a penalty of two percent of the remaining balance before
one year.114 Massachusetts also prohibits the collection of a pre-
payment penalty if prepayment is made after one year, setting the
maximum allowable penalty for prepayment within the first year
of the loan as the lesser of the balance of the first year's interest or
three months interest. 1 5 New York law permits prepayment of res-
idential real estate mortgages and limits the right of the lender to
exact a penalty.1 Under New York law no penalty may be col-
lected unless the instrument expressly provides for it and, in any
case, no prepayment penalty may be charged after one year from
the date of the loan's inception.1 1 7 Michigan forbids the lender to
refuse to allow a mortgagor of property containing a single family
residence to prepay at any time and allows only a penalty of one
percent of the prepaid principal during the first three years, with
no penalty afterwards."1 " Likewise, Virginia limits prepayment
penalties on loans secured by a borrower-occupied residence1 9 and
in various other contexts.1 20 Additionally, at least two states have
statutes that specifically address prepayment penalties in residen-
tial real estate mortgage loans made by savings and loan
associations. 1 "
Two states also have enacted legislation regulating the use of
prepayment penalties in alternative mortgage instruments. Con-
necticut forbids the imposition of a prepayment penalty in this
context,1 22 while Indiana allows the borrower to prepay a variable
rate mortgage, without penalty, for sixty days after receiving noti-
114. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-23-5 (1984).
115. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 56 (West 1977). Interestingly, this statute pro-
vides for an additional penalty not in excess of three months interest if the prepayment is
made within three years solely for the purpose of refinancing the debt through another insti-
tution. Thus, this statute enables lenders to protect their interests by discouraging refinanc-
ing in times of declining interest rates.
116. N.Y GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-501 (3) & (6) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
117. Id.
118. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 438.31c(2)(c) (West Supp. 1986). This statute applies to
land leases, installment land contracts, and real estate mortgages.
119. VA. CODE § 6.1-330.29 (1983).
120. Id. §§ 6.1-330:27:1--6.1-330:33 (1983 & Supp. 1986). These sections limit the per-
missible amount of prepayment penalties on loans made by a wide variety of lenders, in-
cluding credit unions (§ 6.1-330.28), industrial loan associations (§ 6.1-330.30), and unli-
censed lenders (§ 6.1-330.31).
121. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5512 (1981); see also id. § 17-5512(a) (pertaining to
mortgage loans made by savings and loan associations other than residential loans); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 393(2) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-9g(c) (West 1981).
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fication that the rate has risen above the initial loan rate.123 Indi-
ana permits the borrower to prepay roll-over mortgages at the time
of adjustment without penalty.1 24
California's legislation125 is more advantageous to lenders than
many of the statutes previously mentioned. California law prohib-
its lenders from charging prepayment penalties on loans secured
by a mortgage on residential property of four units or less after five
years. 26 Before that time, however, borrowers must prepay in ac-
cordance with any provision in the note calling for a penalty. 2 7 At
least three states-New York, Virginia, and California-prohibit
the collection of prepayment penalties on loans secured by residen-
tial real estate mortgages if the lender accelerates the debt pursu-
ant to a due-on-sale clause. The New York statute applies to all
loans secured by a mortgage on an owner-occupied residence con-
taining one to six family units, and only forbids collection of a pre-
payment penalty if the lender refuses the borrower's request to al-
low the purchaser to assume the note or take subject to the
mortgage.12 1 Virginia has enacted similar legislation. 12 California's
statute applies to all real estate mortgages; the debtor, however,
may waive its rights by a provision in the mortgage if the mortgage
is not on residential property containing four or fewer living
123. IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-13.5-2(5)(C) (Burns 1986).
124. Id. § 28-1-13.5-3(3) (Burns 1986).
125. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2954.9 (West Supp. 1987).
126. Id. § 2954.9(3)(b). Purchase money mortgages are exempt from this restriction if
the lender takes back four or less mortgages per year. Id. § 2954.9(3).
127. Id. The penalty may not exceed 6 months interest on that amount prepaid in any
12 month period exceeding 20% of the original loan balance. Identical restrictions govern
loans negotiated by real estate brokers, except that lenders may charge a penalty during the
first 7 years of the note. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10242.6 (West Supp. 1987). Theoretically,
these statutes permit the borrower to pay off the entire mortgage in 5 years, without incur-
ring a penalty, by prepaying 20% of the original balance each year. This possibility is of
little practical value to mortgagors, however, because the majority of prepayments coincide
with a sale of the property and, consequently, must be made in a single large payment. If a
sale of the property occurs in the first 5 years of the debt, the mortgagor may face a penalty
of 6 months interest on the amount of prepaid principal exceeding 20% of the original bal-
ance. This potential penalty is a harsher result than allowed in most states with limited
prepayment penalties. For example, if a mortgagor borrowed $100,000 at 12% and reduced
the outstanding balance to $95,000 at the end of the first year, at which time the borrower
wanted to sell the property and prepay the note, the California law permits a maximum
penalty calculated as follows: $75,000 (the amount prepaid in excess of 20% of the original
loan balance) multiplied by 12% (the loan's interest rate) and divided by 2 (to ascertain 6
months interest), or $4,500. Compare this result with the result reached under the Michigan
statute, supra note 118, which limits the prepayment penalty to 1% of the original loan
balance, or, in this case, $1,000.
128, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254-a (McKinney Supp. 1987).
129. VA. CODE § 6.1-330.33 (1983).
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units.130
At least one state has passed legislation granting the vendee in
an installment land contract the right to prepay its debt. This
right, however, is subject to a provision in the debt instrument
prohibiting prepayment for up to twelve months following the
sale.' Finally, several states have enacted legislation addressing
the problem of prepayment penalties when condemnation of the
mortgaged property forces prepayment.'32
3. Nonmortgage Debt
Many states have enacted legislation permitting the borrower
to prepay or limiting the amount of the prepayment penalty in a
wide variety of contexts other than residential real estate loans.
Minnesota, for example, forbids state and national banks from re-
fusing early payment or collecting a prepayment penalty on certain
small installment notes,'33 while Oregon strictly limits the availa-
bility of prepayment penalties. 3 4 Iowa has a statute similar to Ore-
gon's, but it applies only to state banks.'3 New Jersey restricts
prepayment penalties on small business loans. 136
The remainder of legislative activity in this area has targeted
mostly consumer credit situations, including installment sales ar-
rangements and licensed lenders. 37 Specifically, many statutes
130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2954.10 (West Supp. 1987).
131. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2985.6 (West Supp. 1987); see also MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
438.31c(2) (West Supp. 1986).
132. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
133. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.154 (West Supp. 1987).
134. OR. REV. STAT. § 708.480 (1985). The Oregon statute provides that upon prepay-
ment of a loan made by a bank, the lender must refund to the borrower all unearned inter-
est except 10% of the principal amount of the loan or $75, whichever is less. Thus, while the
statute does not explicitly mention prepayment penalties, it limits penalties, at least to the
extent that the penalty is in the form of unearned interest, to the amounts permitted in the
statute.
135. IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.906(5) (West 1970).
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-59.28(c) (West 1984).
137. The 1974 version of the UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.509 (1974 Act), 7A
U.L.A. 96 (1985), provides that "[slubject to the provisions on rebate (Section 2.510), the
consumer may prepay in full the unpaid balance of a consumer credit transaction, except a
consumer lease, at any time without penalty." Section 2.510 sets forth two alternative meth-
ods of calculating the refund amount of unearned interest. Id. § 2.510. The original version
contained similar provisions. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3.209-3.210 (1968 Act), 7
U.L.A. 738 (1985). At least 11 states - Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming - have adopted the 1974 Act in
some form. AM. JUR. DESK BOOK, Item 124 (Supp. 1985). The 1974 Act defines "consumer
credit transaction" broadly to include loans and credit sales, but does not include credit
sales of interests in land unless the interest rate exceeds 12% per year. See 1974 Act §§
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permit prepayment and require a refund of any unearned interest
when a precomputed debt is paid before maturity.1
38
Finally, at least two states-Illinois and South Da-
kota-specifically provide that the borrower may prepay at any
time and also is entitled to a refund of the unearned interest in an
1.301(12)-(15).
Even states that have not adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code have enacted
legislation delineating a debtor's right to prepay and the creditor's right to charge a penalty
or retain a portion of the unearned interest. The following statutes, for example, address
prepayment in the context of retail installment sales: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 507
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 13 (West Supp. 1986); MoNr.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-242 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 451-1342 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 97.225
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-41 (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 83.620 (1985); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-11-103(h) (1984). Other statutes regulate prepayment of loans made by various
lenders. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-67-41 & 75-67-127(c) (Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
408.130(7) & 408.170 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 45-135-45-137 (1984); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 399-A:5 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:9A-54-17:9A-56 (West 1984); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 58-7-5 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-03-14(2) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6214(D)
(Purdon Supp. 1986); R. I. GEN. LAws § 19-25.3-25 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2225(3)
(1984).
138. Typically, the refund is calculated as follows:
The portion to be refunded shall be that proportion of the interest or discount which
the sum of the monthly balances originally scheduled to be outstanding during the full
months following such prepayment in full bears to the sum of all monthly balances
originally scheduled to be outstanding, both sums to be determined by the schedule of
payments in the original contract [except that no refund of less than a dollar need be
made].
PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 7, § 6214(D) (Purdon Supp. 1985). Other statutes measure the refund by
the Rule of 78ths. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-12g (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17:9A-56 (West 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-7-5 (1978). The Rule of 78ths is described in VA.
CODE § 6.1-330.32 (1983) as follows:
A. The Rule of 78 is so named because the months of one year, i.e., one through
twelve added together, total seventy-eight.
B. To determine the amount of the rebate of unearned interest under the Rule of
78 on a loan where payment is anticipated:
1. Determine the number of months over which the loan is to be repaid ac-
cording to its terms. Write the numbers in sequence and add (for example, for a
four-year loan write the numbers one through forty-eight). The total will be the
denominator of a fraction to be determined below.
2. Determine the number of months remaining on the loan after payment is
anticipated. Write in inverse sequence and add (for example, for a four-year loan
anticipated after the third month, write the numbers forty-five back to one). The
total will be the numerator of the fraction of which subparagraph 1 above is the
denominator.
3. Multiply the original amount of interest that would have been paid over
the life of the loan by the fraction derived as above, such figure, so determined, is
the amount to be rebated.
Payment anticipated between scheduled payment dates shall not be considered
but instead the succeeding scheduled payment date shall be used in the above determi-
nation, notwithstanding any contrary provision of law.
VA. CODE § 6.1-330.32 (1983).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
installment sales contract for the purchase of a motor vehicle.139
G. Federal Regulation of Prepayment Penalties
Federal regulation of prepayment penalties affects primarily
the residential mortgage market. The impact of federal regulation
in the residential mortgage market is significant because certain
quasi-federal entities trading on the secondary mortgage market
will not purchase mortgages that do not conform to federal poli-
cies.140 The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) have ap-
proved a standard note form permitting the borrower to prepay
and prohibiting the collection of a penalty.14 1 In loans guaranteed
by the Federal Housing Administration142 or the Veteran's Admin-
istration,1 43 the borrower has the same right to prepay, without
penalty, at any time. The right of prepayment also exists for any
loan made by a federally chartered credit union. 44
Additionally, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB),
which regulates all federally chartered savings and loan associa-
tions, promulgated a regulation in 1966 permitting prepayment,
without penalty, unless the loan agreement expressly provided oth-
erwise.'4 5 This regulation, which was rescinded in 1980, also lim-
ited any penalty to six months interest on any amount prepaid in
excess of twenty percent. 46 Because of the volume of lending car-
ried out by lenders subject to its control, this regulation tended to
set national standards for prepayment penalties. 14 Federal regula-
139. The Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121/, para. 567 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986), effectively permits a penalty of $25, while the South Dakota statute, S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 54-7-40 (Supp. 1985), does not make such an allowance.
140. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 6.4.
141. The FNMAIFHLMC Multistate Fixed Rate Note is reprinted in G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 14.2. The Note provision reads: "I have the right to make
payments of principal at any time before they are due .... I may make a full prepayment
or partial prepayments without paying any prepayment charge." Id. at para. 4.
142. 24 C.F.R. § 203.22(b) (1986).
143. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4310 (1986).
144. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(6) (1986).
145. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1979), rescinded, 45 Fed. Reg. 76,102 (1980). The
FHLBB's regulations still require that a note clearly provide for the collection of a prepay-
ment penalty in order for the penalty to be enforceable. 12 C.F.R. 545.34(c) (1986).
146. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1979). This regulation was identical to California's legis-
lation. See supra note 123. The Lazzareschi court cited this federal regulation in support of
its holding that the challenged prepayment provision was neither unreasonable nor exorbi-
tant. Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303,
309-10, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417, 421-22 (1971).
147. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 6.4. Furthermore, states are
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tion of alternative mortgage instruments also permits prepayment,
without penalty, in a variety of adjustable rate mortgages."' 8
Finally, while not aimed directly at the right to prepay or the
collection of prepayment penalties, two acts of the federal govern-
ment nevertheless have an indirect effect. The Federal Truth in
Lending Act 149 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it
150
require full disclosure of any conditions on prepayment and the
manner in which any penalty will be calculated. 51 Additionally,
the Uniform Relocation Assistance Policies Act 52 requires the fed-
eral government to compensate the owner of condemned property
for any incidental expenses, including prepayment penalties, in-
curred in the process of transferring title to the government.'
Furthermore, the Act prohibits federal assistance to any state pro-
ject unless the state provides similar compensation for expenses in-
curred.1 54 Several states have enacted laws to conform with this
requirement.1 5 5
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Any approach that courts, legislatures, or regulatory bodies
adopt in adjusting the rights of parties involved in prepayment sit-
uations should recognize and protect the legitimate interests of
both lenders and borrowers. Although the interests of lenders and
borrowers have been discussed throughout this Note, they are re-
stated briefly below. First, lenders have a legitimate interest in re-
couping the fixed expenses they incur in originating a loan.1 56 Sec-
preempted from placing more severe restrictions on the collection of prepayment penalties
by federally chartered savings and loan associations. Toolan v. Trevose Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 501 Pa. 477, 462 A.2d 224 (1983).
148. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 6.4; see also 12 C.F.R. 545.34(c)
(1986) (allowing prepayment, without penalty, of an adjustable rate mortgage within 90 days
following notice of adjustment).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1693(r) (1982).
150. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(k)(1) (1986).
151. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1986), which enforces the Federal Truth in Lend-
ing Act, provides:
For each transaction, the creditor shall disclose the following information as applicable:
... when an obligation includes a finance charge computed from time to time by appli-
cation of a rate to the unpaid principal balance, a statement indicating whether or not
a penalty may be imposed if the obligation is prepaid in full.
Id. § 226.18(k)(1).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1982).
153. Id. § 4653.
154. Id. § 4655.
155. See supra note 91.
156. See supra notes 24-25.
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ond, lenders have a legitimate interest in taking reasonable
measures to ensure the maintenance of a profitable loan portfolio
by protecting themselves against debtor refinancing when interest
rates fall. 5 ' However, the fact that prepayment penalties represent
a source of income to lenders is not a legitimate concern support-
ing the validity of prepayment penalties. If it were, the revenue
concern also would justify any penalty or fee that one party to a
contract could extort from another. This view is disfavored because
of the bargaining power disparity that often exists between lender
and borrower and because of the law's disfavor of penalties.
Conversely, borrowers should be able to borrow money with-
out being shackled with the unilateral disadvantage of being
forced, through the operation of various acceleration and prepay-
ment clauses, to bear most of the risk associated with interest rate
fluctuations."5 8 In addition, borrowers should not have to pay pen-
alties that are far in excess of any damages sustained by the
lender. Furthermore, society benefits economically from the availa-
bility of capital provided through the lending process; society,
therefore, should act to maximize economic benefits by removing
impediments to the fair and efficient operation of the lending pro-
cess. Society has a stake in ensuring that the rights of lenders and
borrowers are protected fairly so that neither receives an unde-
served advantage over the other. Thus, lenders should not be al-
lowed to exact exorbitant penalties from borrowers. At least one
court, however, has recognized that a one-sided approach favoring
individual borrowers ultimately could make it more difficult and
expensive for future borrowers to receive loans if lenders, because
their interests are not protected adequately, are forced to bear all
the losses resulting from prepayment. 159 Many of the approaches
adopted by various legislatures and regulatory bodies do not recog-
nize or afford adequate protection to the legitimate interests of
lenders and borrowers. For example, those statutes and regula-
tions1 60 granting the borrower the unqualified right to prepay at
any time, without penalty, do not recognize lenders' interests in
profiting on the transaction. In contrast, jurisdictions that sanction
the collection of severe penalties, either by placing a high maxi-
157. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37.
158. See supra notes 42-43; see also supra notes 38-41, 44 and accompanying text.
159. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 206 Neb. 469, 477, 293 N.W.2d 843, 847
(1980).
160. See supra notes 98-99 & 102.
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mum limit on penalties61 or by retaining the common-law rule al-
lowing enforcement of any penalty the lender demands,'162 do not
protect the borrower sufficiently.
Commentators have suggested that, in the context of real es-
tate mortgages, the best approach is that of the Mississippi stat-
ute, whereby a prepayment penalty of five percent is allowed in the
first year, decreasing one percent per year until after the fifth year,
at which time prepayment may be made without penalty."63 This
statute may be more effective than most others in protecting the
parties' interests and providing a penalty that will approximate
roughly the lender's damages upon prepayment. The Mississippi
statute permits more substantial penalties in the early life of a
loan, when the lender is less likely to have recovered completely
the fixed costs associated with the loan's origination; the statute
also discourages refinancing by the borrower during this time pe-
riod. In addition, the statute recognizes the borrower's interest in
being able to transfer the property and retire the debt after a cer-
tain period of time has elapsed. Even this comparatively flexible
approach, however, can produce results that are inequitable and
unnecessary to protect the parties' legitimate interests because it
does not distinguish between different types of prepayment situa-
tions.16 4 An ideal approach to prepayment penalties would be an
adaptable one that affords each party the degree of protection de-
manded by its legitimate interests regardless of the circumstances.
An approach recognizing that the consideration afforded the par-
ties' interests varies with the circumstances surrounding the pre-
payment can avoid the rigidity of some of the present approaches
that produce undesirable results.
When a borrower voluntarily prepays a loan made at a rate of
interest equal to or less than the rate at which the lender could
reinvest the money at the time of prepayment, the prepayment
penalty should be limited in order to compensate the lender only
for any unrecovered fixed costs associated with the loan's origina-
tion and for the interest it will not collect between prepayment
161. See, e.g., supra notes 125-27 & 145.
162. See, e.g., supra note 100.
163. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 6.4.
164. For example, this approach, absent some further provision of law, would allow a
lender to demand a penalty when the prepayment is involuntary. Furthermore, the bor-
rower, even in voluntary prepayment situations, would be subject to a penalty within the
first five years even if interest rates increased. Therefore, the lender would profit from the
prepayment by reinvesting those funds at a higher rate of interest. In these instances, the
penalty serves no justifiable purpose.
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and reinvestment. Arguably, many lenders recover their fixed costs
entirely at the inception of the loan. 6 5 To the extent that this is
untrue, however, the lender should be allowed to charge a penalty.
This determination entails no difficult issues of proof because, pre-
sumably, the lender's expenses and fees will be documented and
easily ascertained. Additionally, this approach recognizes the
"turnaround" time between receipt of prepayment and reinvest-
ment by the lender and compensates the lender accordingly. While
at least one court has questioned the feasibility of tracing particu-
lar funds from prepayment to reinvestment,6 6 tracing actually is
unnecessary. The legislature could fix a reasonable time, such as
"X" number of business days, as an estimate of the average time
required for a diligent lender to reinvest the funds. Thus, a portion
of the penalty would be determined by allowing the lender to col-
lect a sum equal to the amount of prepaid principal multiplied by
the annual rate of interest called for in the prepaid loan, pro-rated
to represent the stipulated turnaround time. While a stipulated
turnaround time would not always correspond exactly to the actual
turnaround time, the stipulated turnaround time element would
compensate the lender for most, if not all, of its lost interest profits
and motivate the lender to mitigate its damages by promptly
reinvesting.
These two factors, unrecovered fixed costs and lost profits due
to turnaround time, represent the lender's only real damages. The
lender has no legitimate interest in discouraging prepayment in or-
der to maintain the profitability of its loan portfolio when interest
rates have risen or remained constant merely because reinvestment
will yield equal or greater returns.
A more troublesome situation arises when the interest rate at
the time of voluntary prepayment is lower than the interest rate on
the note. As when interest rates have risen or remained constant,
and for the same reasons, the lender should be allowed a penalty
that represents its unrecovered fixed costs and lost profits. Fur-
thermore, the lender's need to maintain profitable yields in this
situation by discouraging prepayment demands some additional
penalty. The issue is how to measure this penalty. Arguably, the
lender has suffered damages to the extent that the interest that
would have been paid over the life of the loan, when calculated to
165. See supra note 26.
166. See Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App.
3d 303, 309, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417, 421 (1971).
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maturity, exceeds the interest that the lender will be able to re-
ceive in that same period of time by reinvesting the funds. If the
penalty were measured in this manner, the lender certainly would
be protected fully, but the borrower could be forced, depending on
the degree to which interest rates declined and the length of time
remaining until maturity of the original debt, to pay a very sub-
stantial penalty. Indeed, this penalty could remove any economic
incentive for the borrower to refinance or otherwise prepay the
loan.
The lender, however, does not require such a drastic penalty
to protect its interests. In formulating a policy to govern prepay-
ment penalties, the goal should not be to insulate completely the
lender from all effects of declining interest rates, but merely to
protect the lender from the full impact of debtor refinancing as
interest rates drop. The fact that lenders currently are not allowed
to charge such a drastic penalty, but only one that shifts some of
the negative effects to the prepaying borrower, lends support to
the idea that the goal of prepayment penalty regulation is not, and
should not be, to shield lenders completely from the effects of de-
clining interest rates, but, instead, is to equitably distribute the
risks among lenders and borrowers. The borrower in the real estate
mortgage context already bears some of the risks associated with
fluctuating interest rates through the operation of due-on-sale
clauses that prevent the borrower from benefiting from an increase
in interest rates.16 7 Protection of the lender's interests does not
warrant a penalty that also would render it impossible for the bor-
rower to benefit from decreases in interest rates. A penalty limited
to a small percentage of the prepaid principal would protect ade-
quately the lender without being unduly harsh on the borrower.
There is no reason to forbid the collection of this type of pen-
alty after a fixed period of time has elapsed. The lender's interests
will be no less compelling, and the borrower's no more compelling,
in the sixth year of the loan than in the fifth year. In addition,
allowing a prepayment penalty in the later life of the loan would
not be as harsh on borrowers because, when measured as a per-
centage of the prepaid principal, penalties will decrease signifi-
cantly-to the point of being minimal near the end of the loan's
life.
Thus, lenders should be able to charge a penalty determined
by the three elements discussed above. Again, no difficult problems
167. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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of proof should arise because lenders' unrecovered fixed costs, if
any, should be easily ascertainable and the turnaround time would
be fixed by statute, as would the amount of penalty allowed to pro-
tect lenders' profitability. In the interest of further certainty and
simplification, legislatures could establish a single penalty formula
to compensate lenders for all these elements. Such a formula would
not be unlike several statutory formulas now existing, except that
it would apply only when the rate of interest on the prepaid loan is
higher than the current rate. A single penalty formula would not
apply when interest rates rise or remain constant between the time
the loan is made and the time of its prepayment.
The final prong of this suggested approach would forbid the
collection of a penalty when prepayment is involuntary, either be-
cause of destruction or condemnation of the security or because of
acceleration by the lender. In the involuntary prepayment situa-
tion a penalty will not protect the lender's interests. To permit a
penalty merely would penalize the borrower for circumstances be-
yond its control. First, a penalty will not help maintain the
lender's profitability by discouraging prepayment because, by defi-
nition, the borrower has no choice in the matter. No amount of
penalty could dissuade the borrower from prepaying. Second, there
appears to be no reason to allow the lender to compel the borrower
to compensate the lender for its unrecovered fixed costs. When a
lender accelerates a debt, the lender is the cause of any harm it
suffers and, consequently, should bear the expense. Additionally,
when prepayment is involuntary for some other reason, such as
condemnation, no valid reason exists to force the borrower to bear
the lender's loss of potential interest revenue.
An exception to this suggested approach should be fashioned
to deal with unscrupulous borrowers who might provoke a lender
into accelerating the debt as a way to avoid a prepayment pen-
alty.168 When a lender is able to prove bad faith on the part of a
borrower, the lender should be allowed to charge a penalty, calcu-
lated according to the principles established above.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both borrowers and lenders have legitimate interests meriting
protection when a debt is prepaid. Neither a prohibition against all
penalties nor an across-the-board allowance of substantial penal-
168. See In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing this
potential abuse and the various means of dealing with it).
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ties adequately recognizes or protects these legitimate interests.
Additionally, statutes that attempt to compromise between these
two extremes are not likely to protect adequately lenders and bor-
rowers in the various circumstances surrounding prepayment. An
approach is needed, such as the one set forth in this Note, that is
sufficiently flexible to protect the concerns of both parties in vari-
ous circumstances. The suggested approach would allow the money
lending market to function more fairly, thus benefiting not only
lenders and borrowers, but also society as a whole.
Robert K. Baldwin

